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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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
1. As a part of Soviet strategic logistical planning, it is a tendency of the Soviet Government to concentrate and to develop strategic industries in the rear areas. Primarily the Soviets are developing those areas east of the Ural Mountains, particularly those far from the borders, and secondarily those of Western Siberia, including such cities as Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk. A further tendency is that of concentrating industry near the source of raw materials, as it is believed to be unprofitable to transport raw materials from the source site to distant factory areas. In accord with this theory, smelters, factories, mills, etc., are being constructed on, or very near to, the raw material source sites. Source has no specific information to substantiate this. There is no particular variation between the strategic supply plan for defense against possible attack from the West and the plan for possible attack from the East.
2. The Soviets are greatly concerned about the vulnerability of the Baku petroleum complex, as it is highly concentrated. Although source does not know the exact number, he stated that the Soviets have stationed "many" air divisions in this area, and that the Soviets regard Baku as one of the most important strategic targets for any potential enemy of the USSR. Source heard that many Soviet air divisions were stationed in this area during World War II. Individuals stationed in and about Baku were of the opinion that one bomb dropped on this petroleum center could start a fire which could wipe out the entire petroleum industry of the region.
3. In stock-piling, the Soviets store certain types of ammunition. However, source does not know the types of ammunition, types or duration of storage, or the location of storage points. When this stored ammunition has been determined to be contaminated, it is destroyed. In 1947-1948, the Soviet supply of cereal grains was very critical. Source learned at that time that the Soviet Government was very concerned about this shortage and was doing its utmost to keep supplies up.

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4. The Soviet Army is supplied with a dry ration (sukhoy payek) which is normally issued to troops only before combat, or during an advance to combat positions. This ration consists of crackers, sugar, canned meats, canned beans, etc. Although this ration is intended as a combat ration only, and therefore the troops are instructed not to open it otherwise, the rations are invariably consumed shortly after issue. Source stated that the meat component is good.
 5. When on field maneuvers, the Soviet Army messes by means of field kitchens which are deployed at the battalion level. Each company in the battalion is assigned a day on which it must provide the field kitchen with kitchen police. While assigned to garrison duty, the Soviet Army messes three times daily, in consolidated mess-halls.
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